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Abstract
Mission Operations and Command Assurance-
(Me&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM)
task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission
operations. From a system engineering view,
Me&CA facilitates communication and problem-
solving among flight teams and provides continuous
process improvement to reduce risk in mission
operations by addressing human factors. The
Me&CA task has evolved from participating as a
member of the spacecraft team, to an independent
team reporting directly to flight project management
and providing system level assurance. JPL flight
projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's
effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework
errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of
knowledge allows new projects to benefit from
previous and ongoing flight experience.
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1. Introduction
A long-term program is in progress at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to reduce cost and risk
of flight mission operations through defect prevention
and error management. Flight mission operations
require systems that place human operators in a
demanding, high risk environment. This applies not
only to mission controllers working in the "dark
room" and Deep Space Network (DSN) operators
configuring and monitoring DSN operations, but also
to flight teams that plan the mission and develop the
command sequences and to engineering teams
responsible for analyzing spacecraft performance.
The flight operations environment generally requires
operators to make rapid, critical decisions and solve
problems based on limited information, while closely
following standard procedures (Refs. 1-3). This
environment is, therefore, inherently risky because
each decision made is potentially mission critical.
To contain this risk at JPL, flight mission operations
procedures (as described in Refs. 4-5) currently
require intensive human reviews. In addition, when
an error does occur, rapid rework is required to
ensure mission success. This strategy has worked
well to reduce risk and ensure the success of JPL
missions. However, the large human labor
investment required for review and rework has
substantially conlributed to the overall cost of flight
mission operations and has placed operators in
stressful environments. Prevention of errors would
greatly reduce both cost and risk of flight projects.
Thus, the motivation of the long-term defect
prevention/error management program is to contain
risk in a more cost effective and human supportive
manner by preventing errors rather than reworking
them. The goal of this program is the management,
reduction and prevention of errors.
A major element of this program is the Mission
Operations and Command Assurance (Me&CA)
function. Me&CA provides a system level function
on flight projects to instill quality in flight mission
operations. MO&CA's primary goal is to help
improve the operational reliability of projects during
flight. Me&CA occupies a unique position in the
flight project organization, reporting to both flight
project management and the Systems Assurance
Division of the JPL Office of Engineering and
Review. As a result, Me&CA is able to cross
operational boundaries between teams and offices on
a flight project enhancing inter-team communication
and facilitating problem solving within the project.
This paper describes the development and evolution
of the Me&CA function at JPL and the benefits
provided to flight projects by Me&CA.
2. Evolution of the Me&CA Task
The Me&CA task began on the Voyager (VGR)
project in 1985. In response to an increase in
command related problems a study was conducted by
the JPL Office of Engineering and Review to analyze
the adequacy of procedures, operations and software
involved in real-time commanding with the goal of
reducing errors. Incident Surprise Anomaly CISA)
reports, problem reports written by flight team
members when an anomaly occurs in flight
operations, were analyzed from an eight year period
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Voyager ISA Analysis
(1977 - 1985) to determine the causes of command
errors. This study showed that the major cause for
real-time command errors was human error (Figure
1).
Based on this analysis, recommendations were made
to the VGR project for improvements including: 1)
upgrading the command development software to
improve readability of command printouts thereby
facilitating command reviews and approvals; 2)
providing traceability between command forms and
ISAs to facilitate analysis and correction of command
incidents; 3) reducing real-time commanding by
improving the coordination of real-time and sequence
commanding and including as many commands as
possible in command sequences; and 4) updating
flight team training to include command awareness
issues to inform flight team members of potential
command problems and how to avoid them.
Command development procedures were updated to
incorporate these recommendations. Real-time
command anomalies decreased from 60 in 1985 to 40
in 1986, and to 24 in both 1987 and 1988.
When an opening occurred in the spacecraft team, the
position was filled by a MO&CA engineer who
became the Systems Lead for real-time commanding
for the VGR Project. This placement allowed
MO&CA to not only recommend changes to
command procedures, but also to implement these
changes with project management concurrence.
MO&CA also continued to analyze ISA reports and
make recommendations for continuous improvement
to the commanding process. MO&CA provided both
a system engineering function for the spacecraft team
and a systems assurance function for the VGR
Project.
Following VGR, a MO&CA team was activated on
the Magellan (lVIGN)Project in March 1989, just two
months prior to launch. The main MO&CA task for
MGN was to detect, analyze and correct defects that
existed in flight operations and procedures. One of
the major efforts of the MGN MO&CA team was
assisting the flight project to upgrade the real-time
command process and related operational procedures.
The initial real-time command process in place at
launch included only a handful of steps. Systems
coordination and inter-team communication were not
included in the procedures.
In the first few months following launch extensive
operational workarounds and real-time commanding
were required to compensate for the spacecraft
hardware problems. Because of the level of
commanding and a lack of coordination in the real-
time command process, command problems occurred.
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MO&CA recommended improvements to the
command process which included: 1) review of
commands by all subsystems prior to development;
2) system level coordination of all commanding; 3)
management approval prior to command
development; 4) traceability of commands from
initial request to final approval for transmission; 5)
development of rigid test requirements for all
commands; 6) required representation by all
operations teams at command review and approval
meetings; 7) spacecraft team support of the command
coordination meeting and 8) training for all flight
team members with the newly developed command
procedures.
By December 1989, an updated real-time command
process was in place on MGN. Improved
communications enabled the flight team to function
well as a unit and respond quickly to anomalies.
Real-time command incidents decreased dramatically
despite the fact that the flight team continued to face
spacecraft anomalies.
In contrast to the VGR project, the MGN team was
not integrated directly into an existing team on the
flight project, but instead formed an independent unit.
While this enabled the MGN MO&CA team to
maintain a systems view of flight operations, it did
not provide the same ability to implement changes.
MGN MO&CA instead provided recommendations
for change based on ISA analysis and direct
participation in working, review and approval
meetings. The flight team, directed by project
management, implemented the changes to operations
procedures and processes.
Due to the success of the VGR and MGN MO&CA
teams, MO&CA teams were placed on the Mars
Observer and TOPEX/POSEIDON projects. Both of
these new projects experienced immediate benefits
through the direct transfer of MO&CA's knowledge
and experience from the previous two projects.
These MO&CA teams were the first to be in place on
the flight project an extended time prior to launch.
The teams were therefore able to implement "lessons
learned" and process improvements early. This
opportunity allowed MO&CA to instill quality into
the flight procedures in a pro-active manner, rather
than work reactively to update processes and
procedures after completion of mission operations
development.
Mars Observer MO&CA, like the MGN MO&CA
team, was established as an independent unit making
recommendations for improvements and updates to
command processes and procedures. A prime target
for improvement by the Mars Observer MO&CA
team was operations communications.
The Mars Observer project had strong real-time and
sequence commanding processes in place when
MO&CA began working with the project. MO&CA,
however, noted problems with inter-team
communication and use of ancillary command data.
Four separate operations teams, Spacecraft, Planning
and Sequencing, Mission Control, and MO&CA,
maintained separate command related data files that
resulted in redundant and incongruous data. Manual
transcription and interpretation errors occurred
frequently and unnecessarily increased risk.
MO&CA gathered the file structures and reports from
each team and identified redundant data usage.
MO&CA also initiated and led a working group that
analyzed each team's data needs and identified and
prioritized requirements for the development of a
single command data system. The working group
passed recommendations for system implementation
to the Uplink Manager. An effort is currently
underway to implement an on-line, real-time
command data system to be in place by August 1993.
Another communications issue that Mars Observer
MO&CA addressed was the result of an unique
aspect of the Mars Observer project. The principle
investigators have direct control of commanding the
science instruments. The remote science teams are
situated at several different locations throughout the
United States. Therefore, maintaining
communications between the science teams and the
flight operation team located at JPL is a challenge.
Also, the science teams need to have access to real-
time spacecraft and instrument status for
development of command requests. To facilitate
communication, MO&CA recommended that the
audio VOCA (Voice Operations Assembly
Communications) net be made available to all flight
team members, keeping both science and operations
teams informed of current spacecraft status.
A third communication problem noted by Mars
Observer MO&CA was the definition of the
command uplink window, the time period available
to transmit commands to the spacecraft. Alignment
of the command requester's requirements, the
availability of the scheduled commanding windows,
and the Mission Control Team's coordination with
commanding station hand-overs was complex and
prone to errors. MO&CA recommended that a tool
be developed to allow the Mission Control Team to
interpret, implement and verify the command
requester's requirements for uplink windows. This
tool was developed by the Mission Control Team
and is now being used for flight operations.
Similarly to the Mars Observer Project, the MO&CA
task was also well received by the
TOPEX/POSEIDON Project. A MO&CA engineer
was placed on staff to the TOPEX/POSEIDON Flight
Operations System Manager. The
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TOPEX/POSEIDON MO&CA task combined
elements from the VGR and MGN MO&CA
experience. Like the MGN MO&CA team,
TOPEX/POSEIDON MO&CA functions as an
independent unit, and, like VGR MO&CA,
TOPEX/POSEIDON MO&CA has the ability to
implement improvements in flight operations
procedures.
Once in place on the project in November 1991,
MO&CA quickly assessed existing flight operations
plans and noted that an additional process for the
development and approval of unplanned real-time
commands was required. MO&CA worked with the
flight team to define inter-team interfaces for the
unplanned real-time command process and develop
the necessary procedures and process descriptions.
While the flight teams were preparing individual
team operating procedures, MO&CA was able to
provide a system level overview and develop the
additional process and procedures that cross team and
division boundaries.
As the project planned to use the real-time command
process extensively, MO&CA coordinated the
development of a Real-time Command Library. This
library consisted of all pre-defined real-time
command files developed for repeated utilization
throughout the life of the mission. The most
beneficial portion of the Real-time Command Library
proved to be the Contingency Commands. When
spacecraft anomalies occurred early in the mission,
the Contingency Commands facilitated recovery
operations during a high activity period. The value
added by the MO&CA Real-time Command Library
is also visible daily during mission operations. The
majority of planned real-time commands in the
TOPEX/POSEIDON Sequence of Events are pulled
"off-the-shelf" from MO&CA's Real-time Command
Library.
3. Human Factors Benefits of MO&CA
MO&CA originated in response to a rise in command
errors. As was shown in subsequent error analysis
(Ref. 6) the largest group of errors was human error
(Figure 2). Thus, addressing human factors in flight
mission operations has been the overriding benefit of
MO&CA. The enumeration of these benefits follows.
The most important of these benefits is a direct
transfer of knowledge. Originating from the Systems
Assurance Division at JPL, MO&CA is able to
transfer knowledge between current missions in
addition to providing valuable "lessons learned"
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Comparison of ISA Analysis - Voyager, Magellan, Mars Observer
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experience to new flight projects. New projects are
able to thus benefit directly from both previous and
ongoing mission operations experience. Lessons
learned can be incorporated early into project
requirements, thereby eliminating the amount of
necessary rework on flight operations procedures.
The real-time command process and library on the
TOPEX/POSEIDON project are examples of this
direct U'ansferof knowledge.
Another major benefit is process improvement.
Process improvement activities require the ability to
measure and evaluate a process. MO&CA teams
collect and analyze error data from the ISA reports
written by flight teams on operational problems.
Many of MO&CA's recommendations for process
improvement are based on these reports. This error
analysis results in improvements not only to the
project that wrote the report, but also to other flight
projects via transfer of knowledge. The error analysis
information is also used for analysis in the overall
defect prevention/error management program that
identified human errors as the largest category
(Figures 1 and 2).
MO&CA's unique position as an independent unit in
the flight project organization provides a third major
benefit to flight projects: the ability to facilitate
communication and problem solving. Problems that
span many teams and offices within a flight project
can be effectively addressed by MO&CA.
Coordinating real-time command processes is an
example of this task. Flight project members who
are faced with problems that impact several teams
often bring the issue directly to the MO&CA
engineer when they cannot be addressed solely by
their team. MO&CA is also able to improve the
efficiency of data reporting that crosses team
boundaries. On Mars Observer MO&CA worked
with the teams to eliminate data duplication and
ensure correct data was reported.
4. MO&CA and TQM
The MO&CA function is one example of a Total
Quality Management (TQM) process at IPL.
Specifically, MO&CA embodies the TQM principle
of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) in which
processes are continuously examined and analyzed
for opportunities for improvement. Figure 3 shows
how MO&CA implements CPI in two ways. First,
within ongoing projects, the flight mission operations
environment is estabfished and MO&CA participates
as a team member. In the course of day-to-day
operations, anomalies are documented as ISA reports.
The ISAs then serve as data that is analyzed by
MO&CA engineers for process improvement
opportunities. When these opportunities are
identified, MO&CA provides reports and data to
support recommendations for improvement to project
management. Finally, based on management
approval, MO&CA helps the project implement the
changes back into the day-to-day mission operations
environment. This technique was successfully
implemented on the JPL projects.
New Systems or Upgrade to Exls!Ing Systems Ongoing Projects
I I I Incldent Surprise I
Anomaly (ISA)
Requirements Data
/ _ Flight Data
/ / Implementation Mission Analysis
/ / t _ Test Operations and
_viron m_n__ _rting
Recommendations Recom_ions
Figure 3
TQM Model of MO&CA
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The second way in which MO&CA implements CPI
on JPL projects is on new projects or upgrades to
existing projects. The recommendations that are
developed from the ISA data analysis on ongoing
projects are used as input to system requirements on
new projects. This allows new projects to benefit
from improvements made on past projects as
TOPEX/POSEIDON benefited from the experience
gained on VGR and MGN.
Using this technique, not only do ongoing projects
continuously improve, but each new project starts
with a better set of requirements and better processes
than the last one. At JPL this continuous
improvement feedback loop has improved flight
mission operations processes from the Voyager
Project, to the Magellan Project, and to the Mars
Observer and TOPEX/POSEIDON projects.
Additionally, this Continuous Process Improvement
reduces both cost and risk of flight mission
operations.
5. The Future of MO&CA
Future flight missions at JPL will have smaller
spacecraft and flight teams (Refs. 7-8). Development
times will be reduced and the teams that design and
build the spacecraft will also staff the flight mission
operations teams. MO&CA will need to evolve to
adapt to this changing flight operations environment.
With smaller flight teams the MO&CA engineer will
be taking on additional duties such as command
procedure development and system lead functions, as
did the engineers on VGR and TOPEX/POSEIDON.
MO&CA will also participate during the early phases
of the project, enabling MO&CA to implement
"lessons learned" and process improvements during
development. MO&CA will continue to provide both
system assurance and engineering assistance to
operations. MO&CA can assist in developing
operational procedures and participate in flight team
training, especially enhancing flight team
communications and problem solving. This
participation will streamline procedure development
and eliminate late changes and upgrades thus
reducing rework and cost.
Automation of ISA data tracking and analysis by
MO&CA will help to make operations process
monitoring and error analysis more efficient and
timely. With automation, MO&CA will be able to
address problem areas quickly. Finally, ISA data
will be used in a parallel error analysis study. The
findings of this study (Ref. 6) will enable prevention
of errors through improved requirements
development on new projects.
6. Summary
JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from
MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather
than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide
direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to
benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.
The system level view of project operations provided
by MO&CA enhances communication to facilitate
problem solving within a flight project.
MO&CA will continue to evolve to meet flight
project needs. Early involvement with developing
projects will ensure that quality is incorporated into
mission operations during operations development
and training.
The MO&CA function at JPL has built quality into
mission operations, enabling flight teams to operate
efficiently and effectively in the dynamic flight
operations environment. Since error analysis has
shown human error to be the largest error category,
human factors improvements have, thus far, proved to
be the major benefit. MO&CA, as a TQM effort,
focusing on continuous process improvement and
elimination of rework, will continue to provide
benefits to flight projects.
7. Acknowledgment
The work described in this paper was carried out by
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology, under contract with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The effort of many people from the JPL Office of
Engineering and Review went into the MO&CA
work on JPL projects. The authors would like to
acknowledge their efforts by recognizing the
participants: AI Brejcha, Anna Bruhn, Grant Fads,
Larkin Hamilton, Sara Hyman, Kil-Sun Kang, Mark
Kennedy, Farinaz Kavousirad, Young Kim, Robyn
Lutz, George Nichols, Irwin Plitt, Anne Phu, Richard
Santiago, Mitch Scarf, John Schlue, Hui-Yin Shaw,
William Shipley, Lowell Thompson, Greg Welz.
8. References
1. Horvath, J.C., and Perry, L.P. 1990. Hypercubes
for critical spacecraft verification. In Proceeding of
AIAA Second International Symposium on Space
Information Systems, Pasadena, Ca., 1285-1291.
2. Linick, T.D. 1985. Spacecraft commanding for
unmanned planetary missions: the uplink process.
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 38:450-
457.
361
3. Muratore, J.F., Heindel, T.A., Murphy, T.B.
Rassmussen, A.N. and McFarland, R.Z. 1990. Real-
time data acquisition at mission control.
Communications of the ACM, 33(12): 18-31.
4. Haynes, N.R. 1985. Planetary mission operations:
an overview. Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, 38:435-438.
5. McLaughlin, W. 1987. How to feed a spacecraft.
Spaceflight, 29: 38-40.
6. Bruno, K.J., Welz, L.L., Barnes, G. M., and Sherif,
J.S. 1992. Analyzing human errors in flight mission
operations. A Paper presented at the Sixth Annual
Space Operations, Applications, and Research
Conference, NASA Johnson Space Flight Center,
Houston, Texas, August 4 - 6.
7. Cassini, K., and Spear, A.J. 1992. Low Cost
Spacecraft: The Wave of the Future [Videotape].
Pasadena, Ca.: Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
8. Stone, E.C. 1992. Total Quality Management
Seminar [Videotape]. Pasadena, Ca.: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory.
362
Session H2: ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTS
Session Chair: Maj. Gerald Gleason
